Lord Philip Norton - Evidence in Review

The Commission met with Lord Philip Norton on 22 November to continue our inquiry into reform of the Lords. He led the discussion by indicating the good work of the second chamber in its key task of legislative scrutiny and contribution to the legislative process. The Commons has responsibility for principle and high politics, but the Lords tends to do the heavy lifting in detailed scrutiny.

It was noted that the House of Lords is not the obstacle to change, rather it is Number 10 which exploits its power of patronage and nomination in order to generate party funding and even in some cases personal funding.

Both Houses of Parliament must be legitimate for the government to work, which is why reform of the Lords is needed. Reform is desirable and achievable.  Changes are desirable to the input side of the legitimacy of the House (how members are nominated) as well as the output site (what it does).

Currently the Lords complements the work of the Commons, it does not conflict or duplicate.

In terms of reform, there is scope for developing pre- and post-legislative scrutiny as well as enhancing the process once Bills are introduced.  It would be an improvement to the process if it was the norm for pre-legislative scrutiny to take place, whereas at the moment the government selects which bills go for scrutiny. Legislative scrutiny could even be broader, perhaps via a legislative standards committee, to ensure that bills are consistent in adhering to key legislative principles.

Ministers tend to see success as getting their bills on the statute book rather than whether the measure achieves what it is designed to achieve.  Acts may clash with other existing laws or have unintended consequences or simply not have any notable consequence.  Post-legislative scrutiny enables Parliament to address whether a measure has achieved what was intended.  Post-legislative scrutiny is a public good, but because they are already burdened with work it is not a priority of select committees in the Commons.  There is occasional post-legislative scrutiny, but only usually of high-profile measures.  The Lords undertakes post-legislative scrutiny each session, for example on the adoption law, mental health legislation and equality laws, but this is necessarily selective.  

Utilising the Lords for more consistent pre- and post-legislative scrutiny would allow the House to play to its strengths and be feasible.  Peers are appointed to committees because of their experience or expertise in the subject covered and there are peers willing to serve on committees.

The legislative process in the Lords involves the whole house, either in Committee of the whole House or in the Grand Committee; in either case, any peer can attend, which means that experts from across the spectrum may contribute whereas in the Commons it is only those sitting on the bill committee. However, Commons public bill committees can hear expert witnesses.  The Lords has no mechanism for doing this and it is something that may be worthwhile exploring.

On input legitimacy, Lord Norton has a bill going through Parliament now which would reform the Lords and which has extensive support across the Lords. It includes provision for putting the appointments commission on a statutory footing and protecting its independence, extending the criteria to appointing people of 'conspicuous merit' and ensuring they have the willingness and capacity to contribute.

It enshrines core principles, namely that no party in the second chamber should have an absolute majority, that crossbenchers should comprise at least 20 percent of the membership and that it should be no bigger in membership than the House of Commons.

Currently the Lords has full time active peers, people who have outside jobs and attend to participate when their expertise would contribute and people who do nothing and should be gone.

The Bill provides that party nominations would require leaders to be transparent about why people are being nominated, what criteria was used.

The Commissioners discussed time limits on peers sitting, perhaps 15 or 20 years which would allow them to gain expertise and knowledge.

The Commission discussed the problems inherent in elected chambers, no matter what form of election. Parties would inevitably be involved. Whilst elections may confer electoral legitimacy, they do not necessarily confer wisdom. Another elected chamber would be seen as just another body of politicians. An elected house would claim additional powers and challenge the primacy of the Commons. Elected on a different basis to the Commons it could even claim its electoral legitimacy is superior to the Commons.